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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
and if the attorney has fully performed prior to the discharge, he may
stand upon his contract so as to measure his damages. An action for
breach of contract only arises from a contract of employment for a
definite period.7
A client has the right to settle in good faith 8 the litigation at any
stage 1 without the knowledge or consent '0 of the attorney. The
clause in the contract of retainer which prohibits the client from
settling the litigation without the consent of the attorney is void as
being against public policy."
In the instant case, the fact that the attorney has a cause of ac-
tion against his client does not exonerate the parties who wrongfully
induced the breach.' 2 The attorney has chosen to bring action against
them and the jury having found that they induced the client to re-
pudiate the agreement, they are liable to the attorney for such amount
as the attorney would have been entitled to receive from the client
down to the date of cancellation. It is true that the attorney was
mistaken as to the rule of damages in the case at bar; however, he is
not precluded from recovering, because there is no requirement of law
that the measure of damages alleged to have been sustained shall be
stated in the complaint. 13 It is sufficient if the complaint states facts
from which damages can properly be inferred, without specifically
enumerating the items of damages or the rules of law controlling the
measure of damages. 14
V. E. C.
BILLS AND NOTES-NOTE GIVEN AS FICTITIOUS BANK ASSET-
DEFENSE OF LACK OF CONSIDERATION.-Action on a promissory
note of which the defendant is the maker. The note was drawn by
the defendant to his own order and indorsed over to the plaintiff
bank so as to deceive the bank examiner by enhancing the bank's
assets. The bank president, fearing a "run" on the bank, entreated
and procured the defendant to execute the note, promising not to
hold him liable on it. In an action by the bank to recover the value
'Greenberg v. Resnick & Co., 230 N. Y. 70, 129 N. E. 211 (1920).
'Matter of Levy, 249 N. Y. 168, 163 N. E. 244 (1928); Fisher-Hausen
v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 173 N. Y. 492, 66 N. E. 395 (1903).
'Matter of Levy, 249 N. Y. 168, 163 N. E. 244 (1928).
"In re Snyder, 190 N. Y. 66, 82 N. E. 742 (1907); Lee v. Vacuum Oil
Co., 126 N. Y. 579, 27 N. E. 1018 (1891) ; Bailey v. Murphy, 136 N. Y. 50,
32 N. E. 627 (1892).
4'In re Snyder, 190 N. Y. 66, 82 N. E. 742 (1907); (1929) 6 N. Y. U.
L. Q. REV. 201.
Hornstein v. Podivitz, 254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674 (1930).
"Colrick v. Swinburne, 105 N. Y. 503, 12 N. E. 427 (1887); Winter v.
American Airline Products Inc., 236 N. Y. 199, 140 N. E. 561 (1923).
" Winter v. American Airline Products Inc., 236 N. Y. 199, 140 N. E. 561(1923).
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RECENT DECISIONS
of the note, the defendant pleaded among other defenses, lack of
consideration. Held, judgment for defendant reversed. The defen-
dant is estopped from asserting the defense of lack of consideration.
Bay Parkway National Bank v. Shalom, 270 N. Y. 172, 200 N. E.
685 (1936).
Evidence, although parol, between immediate parties to a note,
that a note is not to be paid and is made for the accommodation of
the plaintiff and also lacks consideration, is ordinarily admissible.'
But when the purpose of the instrument, be it a note, bond or mort-
gage, is to deceive state examiners of financial institutions, then the
defendant will be estopped from setting up personal defenses.2 A
note executed with such intent is against public policy and illegal.'
Generally, courts do not aid parties to an illegal contract.4 When,
however, the public good can best be served by enforcing an illegal
contract, the courts will do so, not as a benefit to the plaintiff but as
a detriment to the defendant.5 A note executed for the purpose of
deceiving state bank examiners, serves in effect to deceive all the
bank's creditors, including depositors, who relying upon the examina-
tion of the state banking department continue doing business with
the bank. If the court here refused to enforce payment of the note,
the very result sought to be prevented would have been attained;
therefore, the bank is allowed to recover. 6
A question arises whether the doctrine of estoppel should be in-
voked against a bank which has not been superseded by receivers. 7
The bank being a party to the transaction cannot plead that the
'Higgins v. Ridgway, 153 N. Y. 130, 47 N. E. 32 (1897); Bernstein v.
Kritzer, 253 N. Y. 410, 171 N. E. 690 (1930); cf. S WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE
(2d ed. 1923) § 2444.
'Hurd v. Kelly, 78 N. Y. 588 (1879); Best v. Thiel, 79 N. Y. 15 (1879);
County Trust Co. v. Mara, 242 App. Div. 206, 273 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1st
Dept. 1934), aff'd, 266 N. Y. 540, 195 N. E. 190 (1935); Mars National
Bank v. Hughes, 256 Pa. 75, 100 Atl. 542 (1917); Cedar State Bank v.
Olson, 116 Kan. 320, 226 Pac. 995 (1924); New England Fire Insurance
Co. v. Haynes, 71 Vt. 306, 45 Atl. 221 (1899). Compare Smouse v. Water-
loo Savings Bank, 198 Iowa 306, 199 N. W. 350 (1924), with Bandel v.
Shaw, 115 Kan. 185, 222 Pac. 62 (1924) (defense of the maker of a note,
as in instant case, that it was executed for the accommodation of the bank,
is a misuse of the term "accommodate").
'Cedar State Bank v. Olson, 116 Kan. 320, 226 Pac. 995 (1924).
'3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1927) § 1632; WHITNEY, CONTRACTS (2d
ed. 1934) § 64.
'13 C. J. § 441 (2); Renier v. No. American Newspaper Alliance, 259
N. Y. 250, 181 N. E. 561 (1932) (judgment rendered for defendant, "not
as a protection to the defendant, but as a disability to the plaintiff").
"3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1927) § 1632; RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS
(1932) §601, gives the following illustration: A, B, and C, directors of a
bank, make notes payable to the bank in order to deceive a bank examiner.
An agreement is made by all the directors on behalf of the bank when the
notes are given that they shall be returned and cancelled after they have
served their purpose in deceiving the examiner. The bargain is illegal but
the notes will be enforced according to their terms.
'Note, Liability on a note given to banks as fictitious asset (1924) 38
HARV. L. REv. 239.
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defendant maker is estopped. Estoppel is invoked by the court be-
cause creditors suffered a loss by continuing to do business with the
bank on the assumption that the bank was solvent.8  If, however,
the bank had not failed and then brought suit in its own name, it
would seem that the action should fail, and the original agreement
between the bank and the maker should prevail.9 The creditors
have sustained no loss and the doctrine of estoppel need not be
applied.' 0 And, therefore, even if the receiver should bring suit, it
would seem that he should collect, not the face value of the note but
only to the extent of the loss suffered by the creditors." New York
courts, however, have extended the doctrine of estoppel in favor of
both receivers and banks regardless of loss to creditors.12
It is submitted that the rule that the maker of a note of this
kind should be held liable is sound. The only practical way to en-
force this policy is to make him pay. In the recent case of In re
Hudson River Trust Co.,13 a director gave his note to the trust com-
pany to be repaid when the financial conditions of the bank improved.
The bank failed. The estate of the director was estopped from set-
ting up the defense of no consideration, since the note was listed as
assets in the published statements of the bank, and the depositors
had relied upon it. This estoppel, invoked by the court to protect
the unwary bank depositor against fraud is rooted in what has been
termed "good morals and sound public policy." 14
S. L.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS-
DISCRIMINATION ON BASIS OF WELL ADVERTISED TRADE NAME-
DENIAL TO NEWCOMERS OF MILK PRICE DIFFERENTIAL.-Pursuant
to an amendment to the New York Milk Control Act,' permitting
price fixing in the milk industry, discrimination was made between
8 Niblack v. Farley, 286 IIl. 536, 122 N. E. 160 (1910); Prudential
Trust Co. v. Cronin, 245 Mass. 311, 139 N. E. 645 (1923).
' First National Bank v. Felt, 100 Iowa 680, 69 N. W. 1057 (1896).
10 Ibid.
'Payne v. Burnham, 62 N. Y. 71 (1875); see note 7, mupra ("The re-
ceiver sues to protect private rights, not to punish falsifiers").
"Hurd v. Kelly, 78 N. Y. 588 (1879) (suit brought by receiver) ; Best
v. Thiel, 79 N. Y. 15 (1879) (suit brought by receiver); County Trust Co.
v. Mara, 242 App. Div. 206, 273 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1st Dept. 1934), aff'd,
266 N. Y. 540, 195 N. E. 190 (1935) (suit brought by bank); Bay Park-
way National Bank v. Shalom, 270 N. Y. 172, 200 N. E. 685 (1936) (suit
brought by bank).
'In re Hudson River Trust Co., fi re Gifford's Estate, - App. Div. -
(3d Dept. 1936), 287 N. Y. Supp. 916 (1936).
1" Best v. Thiel, 79 N. Y. 15 (1879); Schmid v. Haynes, 115 N. J. Law.
271, 178 Atl. 801 (1935).
N. Y. LAws 1935, c. 158.
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